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In 1994 the state of Michigan implemented one of the most comprehensive school finance reforms
undertaken to date in any of the states. Understanding the effects of the reform is thus of value in informing
other potential reform initiatives. In addition, the reform and associated changes in the economic environment
provide an opportunity to assess whether a simple general equilibrium model can be of value in framing
the study of such reform initiatives. In this paper, we present and use such a model to derive predictions
about the effects of the reform on housing prices and neighborhood demographic compositions. Broadly,
our analysis implies that the effects of the reform and changes in the economic environment are likely
to have been reflected primarily in housing prices and only modestly on neighborhood demographics.
We find that evidence for the Detroit metropolitan area from the decade encompassing the reform
is largely consistent with the predictions of the model.
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The last thirty years have witnessed intense activity in school finance reform. Numerous 
states have centralized, in varying degrees, the funding of their public schools. While 
most states have done so prompted by their state courts, in 1993 Michigan centralized 
public school funding through the decision of its Legislature. Instead of being determined 
by individual school districts, school revenues are now determined by the state through a 
foundation grant system. The new system has given large absolute and relative revenue 
increases to low-revenue districts and has capped revenues of high-revenue districts. In 
addition, property taxes have been dramatically reduced and state taxes increased.  
The reform had two clear goals: to lower property tax burdens and to reduce 
variation in revenues across districts. Both goals were accomplished. However, a reform 
of this kind and reach has the potential of leading to other effects as well. In metropolitan 
areas where public schools have residence requirements, households choose locations and 
schools jointly given the housing prices, property taxes and public school qualities that 
prevail in the different jurisdictions. By affecting property tax rates and public school 
revenues, this type of reform can alter housing prices and public school quality. In 
addition, the changes in relative school funding levels (and possibly qualities) across 
districts might induce households to move from one district to another.  
We examine whether these general equilibrium effects took place in the Detroit 
metropolitan area,
2 which is the largest metropolitan area in Michigan and comprises 
about 41 percent of the state population. We use a multi-community equilibrium model to 
develop qualitative predictions about the effects of the reform, and investigate whether 
these predictions hold empirically. For analytical purposes we decompose the reform into 
two elements: a tax reform, and a change in the level and distribution of revenue. 
Furthermore, over the nineties the metropolitan area experienced a significant change in 
the shape of the income distribution. Although all segments of the distribution 
experienced an increase in real income, the lower and upper segments benefited from 
greater proportional increases.
3 To gain insight into the effects of these income changes, 
                                                 
2 Throughout we define the Detroit metropolitan area as the counties of Wayne, Macomb and Oakland. 
3 Using national data, Autor et al (2005) document similar changes in the U.S. income distribution.   2
we decompose them into a proportional increase in all incomes, and a mean-preserving 
income change. Controlling for the effects of changes in the metropolitan income 
distribution proves to be important for empirically assessing the effects of the reform. 
We investigate the predictions of the model using data from the Detroit 
metropolitan area before and after the Michigan school reform, and find empirical 
support for them. This, in turn, has important policy implications. A central insight from 
the model is that, unless the revenue component of the reform alters the preexisting 
ordering of districts by revenue, the primary effects of the reform will be reflected in 
property values with relatively little impact on household location. Changes in property 
value may be accompanied by changes in school quality to the extent that expenditures 
impact quality. However, absent household relocation, such expenditure changes will not 
be accompanied by demographic changes that might affect peer qualities. This prediction 
rests on assumptions about the geographic distribution of housing, assumptions that we 
argue are likely to hold at least approximately in many metropolitan areas.  
The Michigan reform created little incentive for relocation in the Detroit 
metropolitan area because it did not alter the pre-reform ranking of revenue across 
districts. In all fairness, the expenditure changes mostly aimed at small, rural districts 
(Courant and Loeb (1997)), so it should not come as a surprise that the Detroit 
metropolitan area did not see greater revenue gains. However, the very design of the 
reform limited the kind of general equilibrium relocation effects described above, which, 
via peer quality changes, might have further helped low-achieving urban districts such as 
Detroit Public Schools. Although the district’s fourth grade pass rate in math tests rose 
from 16 to 50 percent between 1991 and 1999, and the seventh grade pass rate in math 
tests rose from 8.6 to 34.5 percent, this only meant going from the sixth to the thirteenth 
lowest place in fourth grade math among the 83 districts in the metropolitan area, and 
from the third to the fourth lowest place in seventh grade math. Moreover, as we discuss 
later, there is reason for caution in taking these measured gains at face value. 
This paper makes several contributions to the analysis of school finance reform. 
First, we build on the work of researchers who have examined the general equilibrium 
effects of school finance reform using calibrated models (see, for instance, Nechyba   3
(2004), Fernandez and Rogerson (1998, 2003)), by empirically evaluating these effects.
4 
Second, we extend the work of researchers who have focused on specific types of effects 
emerging from the Michigan reform (achievement in Cullen and Loeb (2004), Papke 
(2005) and Roy (2003), capitalization in Guilfoyle (1998a, 1998b)), by studying general 
equilibrium effects and providing an analytical framework to this end. Third, we study a 
specific metropolitan area, Detroit, rather than the entire state (Roy (2004)) in order to 
focus on a geographic context in which households have access to roughly the same set 
of residential and school choices. Finally, our analysis provides insights that are relevant 
not only to Michigan but also to other states, given that a number of recent state aid 
reforms have reduced property taxes while increasing state funding, and have embraced a 
state aid system with some similarities to the one adopted in Michigan (Yinger (2004)). 
Furthermore, this paper makes a contribution to the analysis of the effects of 
changes in the metropolitan area income distribution on house prices, an issue which has 
not been, to our knowledge, systematically explored thus far. This framework may prove 
helpful in shedding light on the dynamics of house value appreciation and its variation 
across metropolitan areas. While being of interest in its own right, this analysis also 
provides a method for studying the effects of school reform while controlling empirically 
for changes in the income distribution.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes public school 
funding in Michigan. Section 3 presents our theoretical model and Section 4 presents 
some stylized evidence that support our theoretical predictions. Section 5 concludes. 
 




5 the Detroit metropolitan area, which comprises eighty-three school districts, 
had a population of about 3.93 million. The largest district is Detroit Public Schools, 
which overlaps with the city of Detroit and had a population of about a million and a K-
                                                 
4 Loeb (2001) calibrates her model to Michigan data in a partial equilibrium framework. 
5 In what follows, demographic data refer to Census year, and school-related data to the Fall of the 
corresponding school year. Since demographic data are only available for Census years, 1990 data are the 
closest available measure for the pre-reform period. For consistency, pre-reform revenues are also 
measured as of 1989, and pre-reform achievement is measured as of 1991, since the series of comparable 
achievement data begin in 1991. “Revenue”, “spending” and “aid” are per-student measures. Throughout 
this paper, all dollar figures are expressed in dollars of 2000, unless otherwise indicated.   4
12 enrollment of about 182,000 in 1990. As Figures 1a and 1b show, there was 
considerable variation in income and housing value across districts, with Detroit Public 
Schools ranking almost at the bottom. Similarly, local and state revenues differed widely 
across districts (see Figure 1c), as did school achievement measured by the pass rate for 
the fourth grade math test.
6 District average income, housing value, per-pupil revenue, 
and pass rates were highly and positively correlated. Furthermore, the districts with the 
highest property values had the lowest millages
7 (see Figure 1d). 
The school finance reform implemented in the Fall of 1994 represented a drastic 
departure from the previous funding system, a district power equalization program that 
had been in effect since 1973.
8 Sales and use taxes rose from 4 to 6 percent, and 
homestead property taxes fell from a state average of 34 mills to a statewide uniform rate 
of 6 mills on all property. The Michigan School Aid Fund now includes revenues from 
the sales tax, a 6-mill state uniform property tax on homestead and non-homestead 
property, revenues from the state income tax, and other revenues. The state share of 
funding rose from 35 to 80 percent. A reduction of local property taxes and concomitant 
increase of state funding was also a feature of the recent school finance reforms in 
Kentucky, Texas and Vermont. Furthermore, voter dissatisfaction with high property 
taxes was a crucial motivation for the reforms in Michigan and Vermont (Yinger (2004)). 
Proposal A implemented a foundation grant system guaranteeing each district a 
per-student revenue equal to the district’s foundation allowance.
9 Districts are not 
allowed to supplement their foundation allowance. As Yinger (2004) reports, foundation 
aid formulas were employed in forty-one states as of 2004.  A district’s foundation 
allowance is based on its local and state revenue prior to Proposal A (“base revenue”). In 
1994, foundation allowances were determined according to the following formula: 
                                                 
6 The pass rate is computed as the percent of students who obtain a grade of “satisfactory” in the state’s 
math test, which is graded according to three categories: “low”, “moderate” and “satisfactory.” Although 
we report results for fourth grade math exams, the results for seventh grade are qualitatively similar, except 
that pass rates are consistently lower for 7
th grade. 
7 Property tax rates are expressed in mills (dollars paid per $1,000 of assessed value). We only consider 
mills raised for operational purposes (“operating mills”) given that Proposal A refers exclusively to them. 
8 For background on alternative state aid mechanisms, see Yinger (2004). For further details on the 
Michigan reform, see Addonizio et al (1995) and Cullen and Loeb (2004).  
9 To districts with foundation allowances above a certain threshold (equal to $6,500 in 1994), the state 
guarantees a per-student revenue equal only to that threshold, yet allows them to raise additional property 
taxes in order to reach their full foundation allowances. The revenue of these districts, however, continues 
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fa  (1) 
where fa is the foundation allowance and x is base revenue in 1993 dollars. The state 
requires each district to levy 18 mills on non-homestead property, and covers the 
difference between this local revenue and the foundation allowance through state taxes. 
As (1) shows, Proposal A reduced the variation in revenue by raising revenue at the 
bottom of the distribution and limiting it at the top. Although foundation allowances were 
adjusted every year between 1994 and 2000, the weak ordering of districts by revenue 
remained the same as before the reform (see Figure 2). Furthermore, real revenues at the 





The model takes as its point of departure the framework of Nechyba (1999), extended to 
encompass the preference and achievement structure of Epple and Romano (2003). The 
metropolitan area is populated by a continuum of households. Each household has one 
child. Household endowed income is denoted ye and child ability is denoted b. The 
population is normalized to one. The joint distribution of ability and endowed income, 
f(b,ye), is continuous and strictly positive on support [bm, bx]x[ym,yx].  
There is a continuum of houses partitioned into school districts, with the 
population of houses normalized to one. Every district i  is in turn partitioned into 
neighborhoods, indexed by j. There are K neighborhoods in the economy. Houses may 
                                                 
10 The foundation allowance is the state’s mechanism to deliver basic aid, the use of which is discretionary 
for the districts, as opposed to categorical aid which can only be used for specific purposes. A district’s 
foundation allowance is a function of its 1993 base revenue, which includes, among others, property tax 
revenues, state basic aid, and most categorical aid components (Addonizio et al (1995)). Categorical aid 
was also overhauled in 1994, and a large number of categoricals previoulsy included in the foundation 
allowance were eliminated. The largest was the state’s contribution to teachers’ social security and 
retirement. These funds were transferred to the local districts via the foundation allowance to shift this 
rising burden away from the state, and districts must now make the corresponding contributions. In our 
empirical analysis we quantify the increase in revenue between 1989 and 1999 as the difference between 
the 1999 foundation allowance and the 1989 local and state revenue. Although the former is for basic aid 
and the latter includes basic and categorical aid, the bulk of these categoricals correspond to expenses that 
are not discretionary from the point of view of the districts, as explained above.   6
differ in quality h (units of housing services involving features such as size, age, etc.) 
across neighborhoods, but within a given neighborhood they have the same quality. The 
housing stock cannot be varied in quantity or quality. The exogenously determined 
housing service provided by a house located in neighborhood j and district i is denoted 
hij, and the fraction of the population that can be housed in that neighborhood is nij. 
Each child must attend public school. Education is provided locally by school 
districts. There is one public school per neighborhood. A child may attend only the public 
school located in the neighborhood where the child’s household resides.  
All households are renters, and rental proceeds in the metropolitan area are paid to 
an investment fund. Shares in the investment fund are owned by metropolitan residents, 
with ownership shares proportional to income endowment.  We let rye denote the income 
received from the housing investment fund by a household with endowed income ye, 
where r, equal to the ratio between the metropolitan area’s total value of the housing 
stock and aggregate endowed income, is determined in equilibrium.
11 
Households’ preferences are represented by the utility function u(g,h,c;b), where 
h is consumption of housing services, c is consumption of the numeraire, g is the quality 
of the school attended by the child, and b is the ability of the child in the household. 
Following Epple and Romano (2003), we interpret b broadly as school capability, which 
encompasses contributions of the student’s home environment to school readiness. 
Educational expenditures are financed by state income and sales taxes at rates τ 
and  ω  respectively, and by local property taxes at rates t ˆ, with the mix of funding 
differing before and after the reform. We assume for simplicity that proceeds from the 
housing investment fund are not subject to state taxes. The income tax is imposed on 
endowed income, ye, and the sales tax is applied to after-tax endowed income inclusive of 
earnings from the investment fund and net of housing expenditure, implying budget 
constraint: ˆ ˆ (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) e yr c p t h τω −+ = + + +  where c is numeraire consumption and  ˆ p is the 
                                                 
11 In this type of model, properties could either be owned by an absentee landlord or by the households in 
the economy. We adopt the latter option because it is better suited to the study of capitalization. Some 
initial allocation of houses to households is then needed. One alternative is to endow each household with a 
house whose value is independent of the household endowed income, as in Nechyba (1999). Another is to 
endow each household with a share of the total housing stock whose value is proportional to the household 
endowed income, as is done here. The income effects derived from the capitalization of Michigan’s tax 
reform are small in the first case (see below), whereas they are zero in the second case (see Proposition 1).   7
net-of-tax per price per unit of housing. We can then write the budget constraint 
as
ˆ ˆ (1 ) (1 )



















v=ph be the tax-inclusive value of a house with h units of housing services, and  ˆ ˆ tp t = be 
the property tax bill per unit of housing. Notice that p,  ˆ p , t and h will generally differ 
across neighborhoods, and hence v will vary across  neighborhoods as well. The 
household budget constraint is then: 
cv y +=        ( 2 )  












. In what follows we refer to y as income. Let the CDF’s for the 
marginal distribution of y in the initial (1990) and final (2000) periods be F(y) and G(y). 
It is convenient to define the utility function derived from substituting the budget 
constraint into the utility function as: 
(, ,; ,) (,, ;) Uvghyb ughy vb =−      (3) 
Schools produce school qualityg according to the quasi-concave production 
function g=g(θ,s), where θ is peer quality, defined as the average ability of students 
attending the school, and s is spending per student in the school’s district. Spending per 
student is the same for all schools within a district.  
  When choosing locations (and hence schools) households take public school 
qualities gij = g(θij,si) and housing prices in all neighborhoods pij as given. Migrating 
among locations is costless. Thus, a household with income y chooses a location (i,j) to: 
(, ,;, ) ij ij ij ij Max U v g h y b       ( 4 )  
where, recall, hij is the quality of house type j in district i, and vij is the tax-inclusive 
market value of house type j in district i. 
  The analysis that follows does not require modeling of the political process that 
determines local property tax rates, state income tax rates, or the decision to reform the 
system of school finance. Instead, the initial tax rates and expenditure levels in each 
district are taken as given as is the state educational reform. The analysis focuses on 
developing predictions about the effects of the reform and other factors (e.g., changes in   8
the income distribution) that occurred over the time interval for which outcome measures 
are available. The latter is the decade between the 1990 and 2000 decennial Census years. 
Given tax rates and expenditures per student in each district, an equilibrium is a 
partition of the population into districts and neighborhoods, school qualities gij=g(θij,si), 
and tax-inclusive house value vij such that every house is occupied and no household can 
gain utility by moving. We prove that equilibrium exists before and after the reform, and 
characterize the equilibrium and equilibrium changes that are predicted by the model. 
  It is useful to characterize the Michigan reform as having two distinct elements-
the change in financing, and the change in expenditures across districts. The following 
neutrality result characterizes the effects of changing the financing of public schools from 
district property taxes to state income and sales taxes while holding constant spending per 
pupil in all districts. 
 
Proposition 1: (Tax-instrument neutrality) An allocation that is an equilibrium before 
school finance reform is also an equilibrium after the school finance reform if state 
revenues are generated by a combination of income and sales taxes. All property tax 




* s be respectively the vector of residential property tax bills and per 
student expenditures in all locations prior to the reform, and let τ
*
 and ω
∗ be respectively 
the income and sales tax rates before the reform. Similarly, let  ' ˆ t  and t′ be the property 
tax rates and bills after the reform, and τ′ and ω′ the income and sales tax rates after the 
tax reform. Let 
* ˆ p  and  ˆ ' p  be the net-of-tax housing prices before and after the reform 























 is the gross-of-tax price following the reform. 
Finally, let r* and r’ be the return from the housing investment fund before and after the 
reform. These are the ratios of the metropolitan area’s total value of the housing stock to 
aggregate income before and after the reform, respectively.   9
By hypothesis,  ' ˆ t , 
' τ , and ω’ are chosen to keep s
∗ unchanged. Thus, the change in 
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where  e Y  is aggregate endowed income and  ij ij ij Hn h = . 
Suppose gross-of-tax prices are unchanged by the reform:
* ' p p = . Substituting this 
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The change in payments from the investment fund must equal the change in property 
rentals. Hence: 
()






+ =  implies  ˆ (1 ) p pt ω += + , or  ˆ (1 ) p tp ω + −= . This result in (7) implies:  
() () ( 1 ) (1 ) ei j i j i j ij ij ij rr Y p t H pt ω ω
∗∗ ∗ ′′ ′ ′ −∗ = + − −+ + ∑∑                    (8) 
Substituting (8) into (6) and simplifying, we obtain: 
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+ =+ . Now (9) and 
ij ij p pp
′∗ ==  imply that the household budget constraint is unchanged by the reform.  
 
We have thus shown that if gross-of-tax housing prices do not change in response 
to the finance reform, then incomes of all households, net of tax payments and inclusive 
of investment fund receipts, are also unaffected by the tax reform, and government 
budgets are balanced. Hence, the choice that was optimal for each household before the 
reform will be optimal after the reform. Thus, the equilibrium prevailing before the 
reform will also be an equilibrium after the reform. The tax policy change is irrelevant in 
the sense that per se it has no effect on household choices. Tax "reform" only has effects 
if the proceeds of the tax are distributed differently after than before the reform.  ■   10
Remarks:  
1. The preceding result applies regardless of how property tax rates in individual districts 
are changed. There is no necessity that such changes be uniform. They can be completely 
arbitrary, even random. Furthermore, the assumption that property revenues accrue to an 
investment fund is a convenient device for illustrating that, at most, property tax reform 
has income effects that would arise to the extent that household ownership of the returns 
to property is not exactly proportional to income. Such idiosyncratic income effects are 
surely of second order.
12 Moreover, some initial allocation of properties to households is 
required. Endowing individuals with property shares whose value is proportional to their 
endowed incomes seems quite natural. 
2. The assumption of inelastic housing supply is key to the capitalization results. Hence, 
we may view the proposition as characterizing short-run implications of the tax reform. 
In the longer term, reduced  property tax rates would induce an increase in housing 
supply, which would in turn lead to lower housing prices in such locations.
13 The 
assumption of inelastic supply may apply over a longer time frame in metropolitan areas 
that have stable or declining populations. The average metropolitan area in the United 
States grew at a rate of 16 percent over the decade, with construction and destruction 
rates of 22 and 6 percent respectively. Among the twenty largest metropolitan areas, the 
fastest-growing were Phoenix and Atlanta, which grew by approximately 40 percent. In 
contrast, Detroit’s net growth was 6.5 percent, with construction and destruction rates of 
11.9 and 5.4 percent respectively. Thus, while the size of the housing stock in Detroit did 
change over the decade, the change was relatively small. Furthermore, as Glaeser and 
Gyourko (2005) have noted, housing is a durable good that grows fast but declines 
slowly, and whose supply is hence rather inelastic in areas that have stable or declining 
                                                 
12 For example, consider a household with income y owning a house worth 1.6 times the household’s 
income—our sample’s average. Suppose the property tax reduction for this dwelling is fully capitalized, 
with no offsetting loss from increased sales or income taxes. Given the observed reduction in property tax 
rates under Proposal A, the household then has a capital gain of about 3 percent of house value, or .048y. 
While this is a non-trivial wealth increase, it will give rise to modest income effects. If this capital gain is 
annuitized at a real rate on the order of 5 to 10 percent, it translates to an annual income increase of .2 to .5 
percent of y.  Other households will have income losses of similar order. The income effects on housing 
demand and location choice of idiosyncratic income changes of this order of magnitude will be small.  
13 This type of long-run result would be captured, for example, in the Epple and Sieg (1999) framework.   11
populations. Therefore, the assumption of inelastic housing supply over the decade seems 
a relatively good approximation for Detroit.  
3. Of particular importance in urban districts is the presence of non-residential property. 
The capitalization results extend when non-residential property is included in the model 
as a fixed stock owned by metropolitan residents.
14 
From an empirical perspective, Proposition 1 implies that the only effect of the 
change in financing is on housing prices. Hence, only the other component, the change in 
the level and distribution of expenditures, could potentially give rise to either 
demographic changes or school quality effects.
15 To investigate such effects, we adopt 
the following additional assumptions on the preference function U(v,g,h,y;b).  
A1. Separability: The utility function can be written U(w(g,h),y-v;b),
16 where w is 
the “local bundle” of goods accessed by living in a particular location. 
Preferences satisfy the following single-crossing conditions: 
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Condition SCI implies that, holding housing quantity fixed, high-income 
households are willing to pay a higher increment for housing than a low-income 
household to obtain an increase in the quality of education. The SCI condition also 
implies that, holding the quality of education constant, a high income household will pay 
more for a larger house than will a low income household. Condition NCB implies 
neutral crossing with respect to ability for education and for housing.
17 
Following Epple and Romano (2003), we adopt the following assumption 
regarding the joint distribution of ability and income: 
A4.   E(b|y) is strictly increasing in y. 
                                                 
14 Proof is available on request. 
15 If there are multiple equilibrium, it is possible that a switch to another equilibrium might occur. Of 
course, this possibility is also present absent the reform. 
16 This is satisfied by many commonly used utility functions including, for example, the Cobb-Douglas 
function, a utility function that is additively separable, or a nested CES function. 
17 As discussed further in Epple and Romano (1998), there is limited evidence regarding the effect of own 
ability on the willingness to pay for education quality, and we know of no evidence linking own ability and 
willingness to pay for housing. Hence, neutral assumptions in this regard are quite natural, and they greatly 
simplify the analysis that follows.   12
A4 carries the realistic implication that “school readiness” is increasing in income. 
 
Proposition 2: Necessary conditions for equilibrium. Index all neighborhoods in the 
metropolitan area in order of ascending local bundles wk, k=1,…,K. Then equilibrium 
exhibits the following properties: 
a. Ascending (wk,vk) pairs: House value ascends in the same order as wk across 
neighborhoods. 
b. Income Stratification: Given two households with equal student ability, if 
household with income y 2  resides in a higher-numbered neighborhood than 
household with income y 1, then y 2 ≥  y 1  with equality for at most one income 
level. 
c. Ascending peer quality: Peer quality θk ascends in the same order as wk across 
neighborhoods. 
d. Boundary indifference and strict preference for non-boundary households: For 
each pair of adjacent neighborhoods k and k+1, a household with income level 
k y exists that is indifferent between residing in neighborhood k and k+1.  All 
other households in the district strictly prefer their residential choice.  
Proof: Results a, b, and d follow from proof of the analogous results in Epple and 
Romano (2003). While Epple and Romano take housing to be homogeneous and divisible 
with each individual consuming exactly one unit of housing, their proofs of the above 
results nonetheless generalize to the environment studied here. Result c follows from b 
(income stratification) and Assumption A4.  ■  
For the following proposition, we employ the following additional assumption: 
A5: Given any si, sj, hi, hj, and θ such that w(g(θ,si),hi) ≥ w(g(θ,sj),hj), if θi>θj, 
then w(g(θι,si),hi) > w(g(θj,sj),hj). 
To interpret A5, consider two local bundles i and j with a common peer quality and with 
bundle j at least weakly preferred to bundle i. Holding unchanged other components of 
the bundles, replace the common peer quality with any pair of peer qualities that ascend 
between i and j. Then the dominance of i by j is preserved and becomes strict. A5 holds 
trivially when both sj ≥ si and hj ≥ hi. The value of the assumption is for cases when s and 
h do not ascend in the same order.   13
 
Proposition 3: Equilibrium exists.
18          
Proof: We present a constructive proof. Exploiting Proposition 1, we can, without loss of 
generality, treat expenditures on education as financed by a proportional income tax. 
Hence, let τ be the rate required to finance the combined educational expenditures of all 
districts. Recall that income y is endowed income net of the income tax plus revenues 
from housing: y=ye(1-τ+R/Ye) where R is aggregate revenue from housing and Ye is 
aggregate endowed  income of all households in the metropolitan area. Index 
neighborhoods by ascending w(g(θ ,sk),hk) where θ  is mean ability of the population of 
students in the metropolitan area, and sk is expenditure per student in the district in which 
neighborhood k is located. Next, stratify the population across neighborhoods by income, 
with boundary incomes, y
k, ascending in the same order as k. A4 then implies that peer 
average abilities, θk, ascend in the same order as k. From A5 it then follows that 
w(g(θk,sk),hk) ascends in the same order as k. Since the size of the metropolitan 
population equals the size of the metropolitan housing stock, a price normalization is 
required. We set the price, v1, in community k=1 so that 0<v1<(1-τ)ym. This assures that 
it is feasible for the poorest household in the metropolitan area to purchase housing, and 
hence it is feasible for all households in the metropolitan area to purchase housing.  
The boundary-indifference condition between communities k and k+1 is: 
U(w(g(θk,sk),hk),y
k-vk)= U(w(g(θk+1,sk+1),hk+1),y
k-vk+1)  (10) 
For k=1, the only unknown in the above condition is v2. Hence, solve this equation for v2. 
Proceeding recursively, solve the boundary-indifferences conditions for v3,…,vK. By 
construction, then, housing markets clear in all neighborhoods, district budgets are 
balanced, and the necessary conditions of Proposition 2 hold. The latter necessary 
conditions embody optimal school and housing choice by all households.  
It only remains to show that these conditions are satisfied when the revenues 
distributed from housing, R, equal revenues collected from housing. Let revenues 
collected from housing be denoted φ(R) where: 
                                                 
18 Nechyba (1999) proves existence in his framework while also allowing voting over local public good 
levels. We cannot simply invoke his proof because of extensions of the preference and achievement 
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The dependence of house prices on R, vj(R), arises via the distribution of house rents that 
households receive. Appendix A establishes that there is a fixed point R
* such that: 
R
*=φ( R
*)         ( 1 2 )   ■ 
Remarks: The proof provides a computationally simple method of computing 
equilibrium. Array the w(g(θ,sk),hk) in ascending order. Allocate households to 
neighborhoods in the same order. For a given R, recursive application of the boundary 
indifference conditions determines all housing prices. A line search on R, calculating 
prices recursively on each trial value of R, can be used to find R
*. 
Corollary 1: If there are no peer effects, the equilibrium is unique. 
Proof: This result follows directly from the argument in Proposition 2.  ■ 
Corollary 2: There is an equilibrium before the reform and an equilibrium after the 
reform such that the ordering of incomes across neighborhoods within each district is the 
same before and after the reform. If peer effects operate at the district level, then incomes 
ascend across neighborhoods in the same order as house qualities in all equilibria.  
Proof: In the equilibrium constructed in Proposition 3, incomes ascend in the same order 
as housing qualities within districts. Since the reform does not alter the ordering of house 
qualities, the first claim then follows. The second claim follows from observing that the 
order of w(g(θ ι,si),hij) within district i depends only on the ordering of house qualities, hij 
in the district.  ■ 
We next present two further results which suggest that demographic effects are 
likely modest. Coupled with Proposition 1, this suggests that the effects of expenditure 
equalization will be reflected primarily in property value and school quality changes, 
with little impact on the demographic composition of district populations. Absent change 
in population demographics, there will be no changes in peer qualities. Hence, school 
quality changes will be due to expenditure changes. We employ the following definition. 
Definition: Index districts in order of ascending mean house quality. Housing is stratified 
across districts if the highest-quality house in district i has quality no higher than the 
lowest-quality house in i+1.  
   15
Proposition 4: (Across-District Income and Ability Stratification) If housing stocks are 
stratified across districts and school expenditure ascends in the same order as house 
quality, there exists an equilibrium in which households are stratified by income and peer 
average ability ascends in the same order as income.  
Proof: This follows immediately from Proposition 3. 
Remarks:  
1. Proposition 4 implies that, following a school finance equalization that preserves the 
ordering of school expenditures, there is an equilibrium in which household 
demographics are unchanged by the reform.  
2. Proposition 4 relies on the strong assumption of housing stratification across districts. 
In reality, there is generally incomplete stratification of housing across districts. Indeed, 
an attractive feature of the Nechyba (1999) framework is that incomplete income 
stratification across districts can arise because of imperfect housing stratification. 
Nonetheless, the proposition is of interest since school districts with higher spending per 
student also typically have higher quality housing. 
3. If housing is imperfectly stratified, then the school reform may induce demographic 
changes, though it need not.  
We have assumed thus far that peer effects operate at the school level, which is a 
natural characterization with a neighborhood school system. However, with frictionless 
open enrollment within each district, peer qualities would be equalized across schools in 
a district. When peer qualities equalize across schools in a district, the following holds. 
Corollary 3: Suppose peer qualities equalize across all schools in a district and housing 
is stratified across districts. Then, for all equilibria in which school qualities ascend in the 
same order as housing qualities, there is a unique allocation of households to districts and 
to housing qualities. 
Proof: Order all neighborhoods in the metropolitan area in order of ascending housing 
quality, and index neighborhoods by k =1,…,K. With school qualities ascending in the 
same order as housing qualities, households stratify by income in the same order as k.  
Uniqueness of the equilibrium then follows from the uniqueness of the ordering of k. ■ 
Remark: This corollary does not establish that there is a unique equilibrium. If house 
qualities and school expenditures are similar in two districts, peer effects may be large   16
enough to offset those differences creating an additional equilibrium in which the district 
with the lower housing and school expenditure is occupied by higher income 
households.
19 In what follows, we focus on the case in which higher income households 
occupy the higher quality houses.  
Proposition 4’s implication of unchanging household demographics follows from 
the relatively strong assumptions that housing stratification and housing quality 
ascending in the same order as school spending. We note and emphasize that the 
assumption of housing stratification is used only in the proof of Proposition 4 and 
Corollary 3. No other results invoke this strong assumption. Furthermore, conditions we 
have shown to rule out demographic changes are sufficient but not necessary. Even 
absent housing stratification, school reform may not provide incentives that induce 
demographic changes. Also, as a practical matter, locations with higher spending tend to 
have higher housing quality as well. Hence, we believe our assumptions are likely to be a 
relatively good approximation in many metropolitan areas. 
Another important change that took place over the decade under consideration in 
Detroit is the growth of household income in real terms, with proportionately greater 
gains at the lower and upper ends of the income distribution (see Figure 3).
20 It is useful 
to analyze this change in two steps. First we consider a mean-preserving change in the 
income distribution that reflects the relative increase in incomes by lower- and upper- 
income households. Then we consider a proportionate increase in all incomes.  
Figure 4 shows the mean-adjusted cumulative distributions of income for 1990 
and 2000 in Detroit. As the figure shows, the 2000 distribution crosses the 1990 
distribution first from below and then from above, although the second crossing is less 
pronounced than the first. Recall that F(.) and G(.) denote respectively the distributions in 
the initial (1990) and final (2000) periods. Figures 3 and 4 motivate our focus, in the 
                                                 
19 See also Rothstein (2006) for a model in which high quality peers may offset low school effectiveness.  
20 In comparing the 1990 and 2000 income distributions, we faced the challenge that the income bins 
differed across Census years and were expressed in current rather than constant dollars. To create Figure 4, 
we increased the bounds of all 1990 income bins by 50.43 percent (the amount by which average 
metropolitan current income increased from 1990 to 2000). We then fitted each CDF using a high order 
polynomial, obtaining an essentially perfect fit for each. The fitted CDF’s, which have the same mean, are 
plotted in Figure 4 and were inverted to construct Figure 3.   17
development that follows, on understanding the effect on housing prices of a shift in the 
income distribution in which F(.) and G(.) cross at least once.  
To set the stage for this analysis, we strengthen assumption A2 by requiring not 
only that indifference curves in the (w,v) plane of households with different incomes 
cross only once, but also that the vertical difference between two such indifference curves 
is monotone increasing in the local bundle w. Hence, consider households with incomes 
y′ and y″ where y′ < y″. Let (w0,v0) be the point at which an indifference curve of y′ and 
an indifference of y″ cross, and let (w,v′) and (w,v′′) be defined by: 
U(w,y″-v″;b) = U(w0,y″-v0;b)       ( 1 3 )  
U(w,y′-v′;b) = U(w0,y′-v0;b)       ( 1 4 )  




∂  (SSC) 
Common parametric utility functions that satisfy single-crossing (e.g., Cobb-Douglas, 
CES) also satisfy Strong Single Crossing (SSC). 
We continue to choose k=1,…,K such that all neighborhoods in the metropolitan 
area are indexed in ascending order of wk. For ease of reference, we will use “left” and 
“right” to indicate the relative positions of neighborhoods in this ordering, i.e., 
neighborhood a is left of b  if a has a lower index than b . Neighborhoods that are next 
to each other in this ordering will be termed “adjacent.”  
 
Proposition 5: Suppose G(y) crosses F(y) twice, once from below at yc1 and once from 
above at yc2 where yc1 < yc2. Suppose, in addition, that peer quality changes associated 
with a change in the income distribution do not change the relative desirability of the 
housing-local public good pairs across neighborhoods.
21 Then the change in housing 
prices will exhibit two peaks. 
Proof: Let kc1 and kc2 be the indices of communities occupied by yc1 and yc2 respectively. 
Let  k y  and  k y
′  be the incomes of the households indifferent between adjacent 
neighborhoods  k-1 and k before and after the change in income distribution. Now 
                                                 
21  If b and y were independent, peer quality changes would not accompany income changes. However, we 
have assumed (A4) that b and y are positively correlated. Hence, changes in peer quality may arise via this 
correlation when the income distribution changes. We assume for Proposition 5 that such changes are not 
large enough to change the relative desirability of local bundles.   18
kk y y
′ > for all k ≤ kc1 and for all k > kc2. SSC then implies that  1 − Δ <Δ kk vv  for all k ≤ kc1 
and for all k > kc2.  Similarly, SSC implies that  1 − Δ >Δ kk vv  for all k ∈ (kc1, kc2]. It follows 
that there is a peak at kc1 and a “valley” at kc2, i.e. 
22 2 11 − + Δ >Δ <Δ
cc c kk k vv v .     ■ 
Corollary 4: The change in housing prices will exhibit as many peaks as there are 
crossings of the mean-adjusted income distributions. 
Proof: The proof extends the approach to the proof of Proposition 5. 
 
For our final result, we specialize to Cobb-Douglas utility and production 




β, and the school production 
function is 
1− = gs
ρ ρ θ . In addition, we assume that the distribution of [ln(y), ln(b)] prior 
to the policy change is bivariate normal.
22  
 
Proposition 6: An equilibrium of this model is also an equilibrium if all incomes 
increase by the same proportion, m, all house prices increase by proportion m, and 
spending on education is unchanged in all districts. 
Proof: Consider a household n with income yn and ability bn for which (i,j) is its preferred 
location in the initial equilibrium. Then: 
   ( ) ( )
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Now, suppose all incomes and house prices increase by proportion m, which implies that 
all abilities and peer qualities increase by proportion m’.
23 If no household other than n 
relocates, then for household n, the preceding expression implies: 
   
() () [] ( )
() () [] () j j i i b m h h mp my s m
b m h h mp my s m
j i j i j i n i i
ij ij ij n i i




'   and   ' ' '
' '




β δ γ α ρ ρ
β δ γ α ρ ρ
θ
θ
        (16) 
Thus (i,j) continues to be household n’s most preferred location. Since this argument 
applies for all n, the initial equilibrium is also an equilibrium when all incomes and house 
prices increase by proportion m.           ■ 
                                                 
22 See Nechyba (2000) and Epple and Romano (1998) for computational models with induced Cobb-
Douglas utilities.  Epple and Romano (1998) also use the above joint distribution of income and ability. 
23 Under the assumption that [ln(y), ln(b)] is normally distributed, it can be shown that in response to a 
proportionate increase in all incomes, the increase in abilities is proportional to the increase in incomes, and 
mean peer ability increases by the same proportion in all neighborhoods. Details are available on request.   19
Remark: The preceding proof also applies if expenditure on education increases by 
proportion  m everywhere, which would be the case if each district’s education 
expenditure were financed entirely by the district’s property tax revenue.  An important 
implication of this proposition is that, absent other changes, house prices rise by a given 
proportion when all incomes increase by the same proportion even though the 
equilibrium allocations do not change. In particular, then, if all incomes increase by the 
same proportion between two successive time periods and housing stocks do not change, 
house prices will increase by the same proportion.  
  To summarize, our analysis implies that the reform will lead to limited changes in 
demographic compositions across districts and neighborhoods, and capitalization of 
property tax and expenditure changes. The model also implies that changes in the level 
and distribution of income will result in house value changes that incorporate two 
components. One component is appreciation associated with the increase in the level of 
income (Proposition 6). The other component is comprised of relative price changes 
induced by changes in the income distribution (Proposition 5). When neighborhoods are 
ordered by 1990 income rank, changes in house values will exhibit as many peaks as 
there are crossings of the pre- and post-reform mean-adjusted income distributions. In the 
next section we present empirical evidence related to these predictions. 
 
4. Empirical Evidence 
 
In this section we begin by examining evidence related to the model’s predictions on 
ordering, stratification and demographic compositions. Then we analyze whether the 
predictions for property values hold in the data. We conclude by exploring the 
implications of our findings for school quality.  
 
Evidence on Ordering and Stratification 
 
Our model delivers predictions for ordering and stratification across neighborhoods and 
districts as well as changes in property values. To assess these predictions, we use data at 
both geographic levels. In the Census Bureau’s geography, the closest approximation to a 
neighborhood is a Census tract. Hence, we collected 1990 and 2000 data at the tract level.   20
Since 36 percent of Census tracts in Detroit changed boundaries over the decade, all our 
data are normalized to the 2000 boundaries as we use Census data from the 1990 Long 
Form in 2000 Boundaries and the 2000 Long Form. Our data include 1,122 tracts with at 
least fifty specified owner-occupied housing units in 1990 and 2000. We used 
Geographic Information Software to associate Census tracts and school districts. As for 
the district-level data, demographics and house values come from the School District 
Data Book; achievement comes from the Michigan Department of Education and is 
measured by the fourth-grade average pass rate in the math exam, and financial data 
come from the Bulletin 1014 published by the Michigan Department of Treasury. All 
monetary values are expressed in 2000 dollars. In what follows, “income”, “house value” 
and “rental value” refer to averages at the corresponding geographic level. 
In our theoretical, one-period model the value of a house, v, equals its per-period 
tax-inclusive rental price p times the units of housing services h. Since a house is actually 
a durable good whose price equals the net present value of its services net of property tax 
payments (Yinger et al (1988)), we need to derive our theoretical value, v, from observed 
house prices, V. Following Poterba’s (1992) relationship between implicit rent v and 
house value V for an owner who itemizes income tax deductions, and adjusting for the 
sales tax to conform to our theoretical definition of rental price, we obtain the following: 
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      (17) 
where the term in brackets is the user cost rate,  f τ  is the marginal federal income tax 
rate, i is the nominal mortgage interest rate, tˆis the property tax rate, η is risk premium 
for housing investments, μ and  χ  are maintenance and depreciation respectively, π  is 
the rate of expected house appreciation, and ω is the sales tax rate.
24 In the Detroit 
metropolitan area, the average marginal federal income tax rate  f τ  for a household was 
equal to 19.16 percent and 18.13 percent in 1990 and 2000 respectively; the mortgage 
rate i was equal to 10.22 percent and 7.26 percent respectively; the five-year average 
appreciation rate π was equal to 6.8 percent and 8.62 percent respectively, and the sales 
                                                 
24 Note that state income taxes do not affect the relationship between house value and implicit rent unless 
housing expenses are deducted for the state income tax, which is not the case in Michigan.   21
tax ω was equal to 4 and 6 percent respectively. Local property tax rates ranged between 
1.7 and 3.9 percent in 1990, and were equal to 0.6 percent in 2000. Following Poterba, 
we use  04 η =.  and  02 χ μ == .. Finally, we compute 1990 and 2000 tract average rental 
values v by applying (17) to the corresponding tract-level average house values V and the 
user cost rate.
 25 
Since we do not observe house quality h or local bundles w, we construct 
measures for them as follows. Following Ferreyra (2007), we construct a tract-level 
housing quality index that captures housing physical characteristics and neighborhood 
amenities, excluding public school quality. We do so by regressing the logarithm of tract 
average rental price on a set of neighborhood characteristics and school district fixed 
effects, then making each tract’s neighborhood quality index equal to the tract's fitted 
rental value net of school district fixed effects.
26 The motivation for this regression is 
that, broadly speaking, rental prices reflect housing characteristics, neighborhood 
amenities, and public school quality. To construct the tract-level local index w we adopt 
the following parameterization:wg h
α δ = , with  0.12 α = and  0.16 δ = .
27 In this index, g 
(achievement) is constant within a district while h varies across tracts and districts.  
According to Proposition 2, income, rental value and the local bundle ascend in 
the same order across neighborhoods in equilibrium. Hence, panel (a) of Table 1 shows 
tract-level correlations of income, rental value and the local index, w, for 1990 and 2000. 
Corollary 2 of Proposition 3 implies that the within-district ordering of income, rental 
value and the local index is the same before and after the reform. Thus, panel (b) in Table 
1 shows the partial correlation of each of these variables across the years 1990 and 2000 
                                                 
25 We calculated the average marginal federal income tax rate using Taxsim from www.nber.org along with 
the 1990 and 2000 distributions of household income for Detroit. Mortgage rates are from the Federal 
Housing Board. We calculated the five-year average appreciation rates using data from the Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight. The property tax rates used in these calculations equal half of the 
actual rates because property is assessed at half of its market value in Michigan, although the results do not 
vary substantially when using the actual rates. 
26 For 1990, we use 1990 tract-level data from the 1990 Long Form in 2000 Boundaries. As neighborhood 
characteristics in the regression, we use tract average housing characteristics from the Census, and linear 
and quadratic terms in tract distance to the metropolitan area center. See Ferreyra (2002) for more details 
on the computation of the housing qualities. 
27 These parameter values come from column (1) of Table 3 in Ferreyra (2007), who structurally estimates 
a general equilibrium model of residential and school choice closely related to the one presented in this 
paper. To construct h for 2000, we use the 1990 coefficients from the rental value regression described 
above and apply them to 2000 data. Results are robust to the use of spending per student rather than 
achievement in the w index.   22
controlling for district fixed effects. The high correlations of incomes and rental values in 
panels (a) and (b) lend support to Propositions 2 and 3.  
Proposition 4 establishes conditions such that house quality, income, achievement 
and rental values ascend in the same order across districts. Hence, panel (c) of Table 1 
displays 1990 and 2000 district-level correlations among these variables. Since 
Proposition 4 also establishes conditions such that the ordering of each of these variables 
across districts is the same in both years, Panel (d) of Table 1 shows the correlation 
between the 1990 and 2000 values for each of these variables. The high correlations in 
panels (c) and (d) provide evidence in favor of Proposition 4. The correlations with 
respect to achievement test scores are less strong.
28 Provided the conditions established in 
Proposition 4 hold, the across-neighborhood ordering of income, rental value and the 
local index should be the same in 1990 and 2000. To assess this implication, panel (e) of 
Table 1 displays the tract-level correlation for these variables between 1990 and 2000. 
The high correlations in panel (e) support the implication. 
An alternative way to assess the ordering and stratification predictions is the 
analysis of rank order violations (see Table 2). Proposition 2, for instance, predicts that 
income, rental value and the local bundle have the same ordering across neighborhoods. 
If this prediction holds in the data, then the ranking of tracts by the local index should be 
the same as the ranking by income. Thus, counting the number of pair wise rank order 
violations between the local index and income provides an empirical assessment of the 
prediction. A similar reasoning can be applied to assess the remaining predictions. Since 
the metropolitan area contains 1,122 tracts and 83 districts, there are 628,881 possible 
pair wise rank order violations in tract-level data and 3,402 in district-level data.
29  
Columns (1) and (2) investigate rank order violations of income and rental value 
with respect to the local index at the tract level for 1990 and 2000, respectively. As 
                                                 
28 Although Table 1’s correlations involving achievement are comparatively low, it should be kept in mind 
that the achievement measure is likely to be affected by substantial measurement error, as Kane and Staiger 
(2002) have documented. In principle, such error would tend to decline with district size. Indeed, when we 
compute weighted correlations taking into account district size, all the correlations involving achievement 
rise. Perhaps a more serious issue is the imperfect measure that achievement scores provide of the 
underlying construct of interest, discussed further in the section below on school quality.  
29 From a list of N elements, N(N-1) pairs of distinct elements can be formed. In half of them the first 
element will be no smaller than the second, and in the other half the first element will be smaller than the 
second. Hence, N(N-1)/2 is the maximum number of pair wise rank order violations in a set of N elements.   23
column (1) indicates, in 1990 the income ordering of only 14.1 percent of tracts in 1990 
differs from the local index ordering, and the rental value ordering of only 10.8 percent of 
tracts differs from the local index ordering. The results are very similar for 2000. Thus, 
columns (1) and (2) provide additional support for Proposition 2. Also consistent with our 
correlation analysis, column (3) provides evidence that income, rental value and the local 
index have approximately the same ranking in 1990 and 2000.  
Since Proposition 4 relies on the assumption of housing stratification, columns (4) 
and (5) investigate the validity of this assumption through the following procedure. First, 
we sort districts by increasing order of district average housing quality. Then, within each 
district we sort tracts by increasing order of housing quality. If there were stratification 
across districts, the resulting list of tracts should be perfectly sorted by housing quality – 
equivalently, each tract’s position in the list should be equal to its quality ranking in the 
metropolitan area. Thus, counting the number of pair wise rank order violations in the 
tract-level housing quality list offers an assessment of the stratification assumption. The 
small percent of pair wise rank order violations each year provides reasonable evidence 
that the assumption holds in the data. Addressing Proposition 4, columns (6) and (7) 
investigate rank order violations of income, rental value and achievement relative to 
housing quality at the district level. These results, illustrated in Figure 5 for 1990, 
indicate that the ordering of these variables is approximately the same across districts 
each year. Finally, column (8) provides evidence that housing quality, income, rental 
value and achievement have the same ordering across years. 
The prediction that the income ordering across districts and neighborhoods is the 
same before and after the reform suggests that each period the demographic cross section 
will be a replica of the previous one. Given that people age, this does not rule out 
household relocation across neighborhoods and districts. Rather, it implies that arrivals of 
young households and departures of old households are such that neighborhood and 
district demographics are maintained. The evidence presented in Tables 1 and 2 indicates 
that district and neighborhood demographics are indeed highly stable.
30  
                                                 
30 To our knowledge, the only other studies that examine the impact of school finance reform on 
community demographics are Aaronson (1999), who uses panel data from several states, Keely (2005), 
who focuses on the Kentucky school finance reform, and Roy (2004), who studies the Michigan reform. 
None of these studies finds evidence of demographic changes.   24
To summarize, our correlation and rank order violation analyses lend considerable 
support to our ordering and stratification predictions, particularly with respect to incomes 
and rental values. The correlations of the local index with income are also relatively 
supportive. The evidence with respect to achievement scores is less strong. However, as 
we noted earlier, achievement is the most difficult of the model’s constructs to measure 
accurately.  We now turn to the predictions for house values and capitalization. 
 
Evidence on Property Values and Capitalization 
 
Our model suggests that the following regression, run on neighborhood level data, should 
capture the changes in house values predicted by Propositions 1, 3, 5 and 6: 
2
12 3 4 ˆ ˆ V aV b tV b s b rank b rank Δ= +Δ +Δ + +   (18) 
where  Δ represents changes between 1990 and 2000, V stands for 1990 neighborhood 
average value, t ˆ is effective property tax rate, s is average local and state revenue, and 
rank is the 1990 tract rank by average household income.
31 Coefficients b1 and b2 capture 
the capitalization of the property tax and spending reform, respectively, and b3 and b4 
capture the effect of the mean-preserving change in the income distribution. Parameter a 
is the percentage rate of growth of property values not associated with changes in 
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where the constant term represents the proportionate change in housing price associated 
with a proportionate increase in income.
32,33 
                                                 
31 The effective property tax rate is half of the nominal tax rate because property is assessed at half of its 
market value. Since average house value in 1990 is only reported for specified owner-occupied housing 
units (one-family houses on less than 10 acres without a business or medical office on the property), our 
1990 and 2000 data on house value pertain to specified owner-occupied housing units. In the average tract 
in our sample, these account for about 87 percent of all owner-occupied housing units. Although an 
alternative summary of tract value is the median, we chose to focus on the average because the 
normalization of the 1990 data to 2000 boundaries did not have access to individual-level data but to block 
level data, which were then aggregated up to the tract level. Hence, the resulting tract medians are not the 
actual medians which would be obtained through access to the original individual-level data but rather the 
weighted averages of block-level medians. 
32 Hu and Yinger (2007) also exploit the difference in tract-level average house value between 1990 and 
2000 to study the capitalization of school district consolidation in the state of New York.    25
  Columns (1) and (3) of Table 3 present the results for regression (19) for the full 
sample. To interpret the coefficient on millage change, consider an unanticipated small 
change in tˆ in a short run interval when the tax-inclusive implicit rent v does not change 
and the house value V changes only because of changes in t ˆ. Then the rate of change in 
V with respect to tˆ is:
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    (20)   
Given our measures for the components of the user cost rate, the rate of change in V with 
respect to t ˆ implied by equation (20) is -7.49 and -14.70 for 1990 and 2000, respectively. 
Thus, other things constant, our regression should yield a value for b1 on the order of -
1500 to -700 if property taxes were fully capitalized. Our coefficients on millage change 
in columns (1) and (3) fall in this range and hence are consistent with full capitalization.
35 
They imply an average increase in property values close to 10 percent. 
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the district average spending in 1990 was equal to $6,323, and the tract average value 
was equal to $105,304, our estimates of the elasticity of house value with respect to 
revenue equal 0.48 and 0.41 respectively in columns (1) and (3) of Table 3.
36 
                                                                                                                                                 
33 We do not conduct a similar analysis for renter-occupied housing because rental property is categorized 
as non-homestead in Michigan (Lockwood (2002)), and the tax reform was less favorable to non-
homestead than homestead property (see Section 2). In our sample, for instance, the average district 
achieved a non-homestead property tax reduction of approximately 6 mills. The effect of such a small 
change would hardly be identified with any precision. Also the increase in the taxable value of homestead 
property was capped at the lower of the rate of inflation or 5% per year. Given the low post-reform millage 
rate, the effect of this tax cap on properties that appreciated faster than the cap is quite small. 
34 We believe this approach, employing the user cost of housing, has not previously been used to deriving 
implications for capitalization. Yinger et al (1998) presents the conventional derivation. 
35 In their review of capitalization studies, Yinger et al (1998) document modest rates of tax capitalization. 
In a study published shortly afterwards, Palmon and Smith (1998) find evidence of full capitalization. More 
recently, Fischel (2001) reviews capitalization studies and points to flaws and limitations in their design 
that drive the partial capitalization result. 
36 In judging this correlation, it is important to bear in mind that education expenditure is an annualized 
value whereas property value measures the present value of the flow of housing services. When the 
elasticity estimates are interpreted with this in mind, the estimates are quite plausible. For instance, based 
on Table’s 3 column 1, the predicted increase in value for a tract with the district average increase in 
revenue ($650) is about $5,200. Annuitized with a rate of 5 or 10 percent, this increase in revenue is   26
  Proposition 5 and the associated corollary establish that, relative to neighborhood 
income rank, the changes in house value should have the same number of peaks as there 
are crossings of the CDF’s in Figure 4. There is a crossing of the CDF’s toward the lower 
end of the income distribution, implying that there should be at least one peak. We find a 
second crossing at approximately the 90
th percentile of the income distribution. When we 
employ a quadratic function of rank, the coefficients on the normalized income rank and 
rank squared in column (1) of Table 3 suggest that the change in house prices follows an 
inverted U-shaped form. The coefficients of the rank variables in column (3) indicate 
another peak at the very top end. The latter is consistent with the second crossing toward 
the high end of the income distribution. The model implies that the peaks should occur at 
the income levels at which the CDF’s cross. The peaks implied by the regressions in 
columns (1) and (3) are broadly consistent with this prediction. Given that our 
polynomial function is an approximation to the unknown function characterizing the 
pattern of price changes, we view the shape of the polynomial as quite encouraging 
evidence in support of this prediction.
37 Finally, the constants indicate the estimated 
proportionate change in house values. According to Proposition 6, the estimated constant 
should be of similar magnitude to the increase in real net-of-tax average income, which 
was approximately 12 percent between 1990 and 2000. The estimated constant terms in 
columns (1) and (3) of Table 3 are not significantly different from 12. 
Note that all coefficients in Table 3 are statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level when the errors are not corrected for clustering. Correcting the standard errors for 
arbitrary within-district correlation and heteroskedasticity causes our standard errors rise, 
particularly for the two district-level variables and the constant (millage and expenditure 
changes are invariant across neighborhoods in a district). While the coefficients on 
expenditure change remain significant when standard errors are cluster corrected, the 
coefficients on the millage change and the constant terms do not. Nonetheless, we view 
the correct magnitude of these coefficients as encouraging, while recognizing the lack of 
                                                                                                                                                 
between $6,500 and $13,000. Hence, the increase in revenue is capitalized at a rate between 40 and 80 
percent ($5,200/$13,000 and $5,200/$6,500 respectively). Dee (2000) conducts a similar calculation to 
study the capitalization of school finance reform. Using discount rates of 5 or 10 percent, his results imply 
capitalization rates between 50 and 100 percent, which are comparable to ours. 
37 When we estimate the regression in column (1) of Table 3 without the functions of income rank, the 
coefficients on tax and revenue change rise by about 50 percent. These results highlight the importance of 
controlling for the effects of changes in the income distribution.   27
precision of the estimated effects of tax changes that arises due to the intra-district 
correlation of the observations. 
  The investigation of the robustness of our findings proves to be reassuring. There 
are seven Census tracts with appreciation rates above 200 percent, which is higher than 
the 99
th percentile of appreciation rates.  To verify that these outliers do not dominate our 
regression results, columns (2) and (4) present estimates for the dataset that excludes 
them. The results differ little from those in columns (1) and (3).  
In our experimentation with higher order polynomials of rank, we find, not 
surprisingly, that the estimate of the constant term is sensitive to the order of the 
polynomial (compare columns (1) and (3), and (2) and (4)) of Table 3). For instance, 
Figure 6 displays the predicted increases in house values associated with estimating a 
cubic regression while imposing alternative values for the constant term. Since 
Proposition 6 implies that a value of 12 would be consistent with the observed increase in 
average household income, we use estimates from a regression including a cubic function 
of income rank and an intercept of 12 to calculate the predicted effects of income rank on 
house value. These effects imply median and mean changes in house prices of 6.6 percent 
and 9.6 percent respectively. Hence, the effects of changes in the shape of the income 
distribution are non-trivial in magnitude.  
We repeat our analysis using Weighted Least Squares (see Table 4) with the 
square root of the number of specified owner-occupied housing units as our weighting 
variable. The WLS results tell qualitatively the same story as the OLS results, reinforcing 
the robustness of our findings. Nonetheless, since our analysis employs aggregate data, 
the concern exists that changes in the composition of the housing stock might be driving 
our results. Thus, we repeat our analysis only for tracts with low construction and 
destruction rates, low vacancy and high ownership, and small changes in vacancy and 
ownership. While we do not report the details in the interest of space, the results prove to 
be quite robust to these screenings of the data. 
Although our evidence is consistent with full capitalization, this evidence faces 
two substantive limitations – namely, the use of aggregate rather than individual-level 
data, and a broad time window (1990-2000) around the reform. Ideally, we would 
circumvent these problems by observing housing units sold twice, once before and once   28
after the reform, during a small window of time around it. Such an analysis was carried 
out by Guilfoyle (1998a, 1998b), who used data on houses sold both in 1992 and 1996. 
His preferred specification using house-level data yields evidence of a capitalization rate 
below full capitalization. His estimates using mean sales prices for each community in 
Oakland County between 1990 and 1996, which are more comparable to ours because 
they rely on aggregate data, are closer to full capitalization.
38 
To summarize, our empirical results provide evidence of full capitalization of the 
property tax reduction, capitalization of the revenue reform, and changes in house values 
associated with changes in the income distribution over the decade. This evidence is 
consistent with the theoretical predictions emerging from our model.  
 
Effects on School Quality 
 
The evidence that indicates limited changes in district demographics implies that peer 
quality in public schools should not have changed much. Absent changes in peer quality, 
the observed changes in school quality should be solely related with changes in revenue 
according to our model. Hence, we now investigate changes in school achievement over 
the decade using fourth grade math pass rates in 1991 and 1999, depicted in Figure 7. 
Column (1) of Table 5 shows the regression of the change in pass rate on the change in 
revenues. According to this coefficient, an extra thousand dollars is associated with about 
six additional percentage points in the fourth grade pass rate. This is close to 40 percent 
of the standard deviation in 1991 test scores, similar to the 40 or 50 percent obtained by 
Roy (2004) and slightly above some of the estimates from Papke (2005).  
Nonetheless, column (2) of Table 5 suggests some caution, as similar evidence 
presented by Cullen and Loeb (2004) does for the entire state. Once we control for the 
1991 pass rate, the coefficient on revenue falls due to the negative correlation between 
the increase in revenue and the initial pass rate. Thus, at least part of the positive 
association between revenue and achievement gains might be driven by the fact that the 
                                                 
38 Since Guilfoyle’s effective property tax rate is divided by a real interest rate of 3 percent, we divide his 
tax rate coefficients by 0.03 to compare to ours. Given that his dependent variable is the log of property 
values, these coefficients should be between -15 and -7 to be consistent with full capitalization. After 
dividing by 0.03, the resulting coefficients are between -5.5 and -3.5 for his dual sales sample, and between 
-9 and -8 for his aggregate data.    29
districts with the largest revenue gains had the highest potential for academic gains 
because they had the lowest initial achievement. Furthermore, the mere magnitude of the 
decade’s improvement suggests that factors other than the revenue increase may have 
been associated with the achievement gains, not least of which might be the progressive 
learning about the test, first administered in 1991, on the part of students and teachers.
39 
To summarize, the data provide evidence of capitalization of the property tax and 
revenue reform, and of the house value changes associated with changes in the income 
distribution. Furthermore, the data suggest that although the reform favored the low-
revenue districts, demographics in these (or other) districts did not change much. 
Nonetheless, low-revenue districts experienced the largest achievement gains, although 
these might not have been fully associated with revenue gains.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
We investigate whether the school funding and property tax reform implemented in 
Michigan in 1994 caused general equilibrium effects in the Detroit metropolitan area. 
Our stylized model of the reform implies that we should primarily expect changes in 
house values and revenues, capitalization of the tax and revenue reform, no demographic 
changes, and  school quality improvement associated to the revenue increase. These 
predictions are broadly consistent with the data. While the predictions on demographics 
and school quality rely on the initial equilibrium satisfying certain conditions, these are 
not overly restrictive. A further contribution of the paper is the analysis of the effects of 
the shift of the income distribution in the Detroit metropolitan area. We have decomposed 
these changes into a change in the mean and a mean-preserving change for analytical 
purposes, and have found empirical support for the predicted effect of such changes. The 
analysis of the effects of changes in the income distribution is of interest in its own right, 
and further research might apply the theoretical framework presented here to shed light 
                                                 
39 Fuller et. al. (2006) provide extensive evidence that state achievement tests often register improvements 
when little or no improvement is found on national tests of the same student population, reporting 
“…yawning gaps between federal and state test results…”. Roy (2003) provides evidence that Michigan’s 
academic gains are much smaller when measured by federal rather than state tests.  Whereas the adoption 
of public school choice, charter schools and accountability measures may have boosted achievement, 
Courant et al (2003) document little activity in this regard in the Detroit metropolitan area by 2000.   30
on some of the dramatic differences in house value appreciation across different 
metropolitan areas over the past decade.   
  Our analysis does not incorporate private schools. Some results such as 
Proposition 1 extend immediately when there are private schools. Thus, our model 
predicts that the tax instrument changes associated with the Michigan reforms would not 
affect the allocation between public and private schools. Other results can be extended 
when suitably amended. For example, the ascending bundles property applies if all 
neighborhood public schools continue to attract students, i.e., no neighborhood school is 
entirely supplanted by private schools.  Other results do not extend. In particular, as 
Nechyba (1999, 2000) has emphasized, households attending private schools locate 
without regard to public school quality. Thus, the income stratification property in 
Proposition 2(b) need not hold in the presence of private schools. However, private 
schools serve a small proportion of students, and we would expect that the modest 
changes in public school expenditure from the Michigan reform would have little impact 
on the allocation of students between public and private schools. Indeed, the change in 
the proportion of students attending private schools in the Detroit metropolitan area was 
only 0.7 percentage points over the period from 1990 to 2000. Given the relatively small 
“market share” of private schools, we would not expect the effects of the Michigan public 
school reforms to be significantly altered by the presence of private schools. 
  Our analysis rests, inter alia, on the assumption that housing stocks are fixed. In 
the long run, this assumption is clearly untenable. Indeed, recent research (Brueckner and 
Rosenthal (2005)) suggests that, over the long term, redevelopment may have a 
transformative effect on urban areas. As we noted in the discussion of our empirical 
analysis, substantial redevelopment may have occurred in some Census tracts in the 
Detroit metropolitan area. Thus, the decade-long interval to which we are restricted by 
data may be stretching the limits of the fixed-stock assumption. Nonetheless, the broad 
congruence between the model’s predictions and our empirical findings suggests that the 
framework can be helpful in assessing short- to medium-term effects of policy changes. 
Hence, we believe that our analytical perspective is useful in understanding the effects of 
the Michigan reform and that similar analyses can prove useful more generally in 
anticipating effects of actual and prospective school finance reforms.    31
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TABLE 1 
Tract- and District-Level Correlations 
 




Rental Value Local Index
Income   1.000 
 
     












b. Within-District Tract-Level Correlations Across 1990 and 2000 
 
Income Rental Value  Local Index
0.865 0.881  0.861 
 
c. 1990 and 2000 District-Level Correlations (2000 correlations in italics) 
 









    




     























0.951 0.976  0.981  0.739 
 
e. Tract-Level Correlations Across 1990 and 2000 
 
Income Rental Value  Local Index
0.944 0.953  0.900 
 
 
Number of observations: 1122 Census tracts, 83 schools districts. Source: 1990 Long Form in 
2000 Boundaries, 2000 Long Form, School District Data Book, Michigan Department of 
Education, and authors’ own calculations.  34
TABLE 2 






























Income, Local Index  14.1  17.4             
Rental Value, Local Index  10.8  15.2             
2000 Income, 1990 Income        10.3           
2000 Rental Value, 1990 Rental Value      7.2           
2000 Local Index, 1990 Local Index      14.6           
Housing Quality
40       16.9  17.7       
Income, Housing Quality            10.2  14.6   
Rental Value, Housing Quality            16.3  19.5   
Achievement, Housing Quality            25.8  32.6   
2000 Housing Quality, 1990 Housing Quality               9.5 
2000 Income, 1990 Income                7.1 
2000 Rental Value, 1990 Rental Value                8 
2000 Achievement, 1990 Achievement                20.8 
 
Source: authors’ own calculations based on the sources for Table 1.
                                                 
40 For an explanation of the rank order violations listed on this row, see the text.   35
TABLE 3 

















































































number of observations  1122  1115 1122 1115
R
2  0.194 0.267 0.199 0.276
s.e. of regression 33.417  25.889 33.339 25.745
mean of dependent variable (in percentage points) 52.605 51.012 52.605 51.012
include tracts with percent change in tract average house value > 200 percent? Yes No Yes No
Unit of observation: Census tract with at least 50 specified owner-occupied housing units in 1990 and 2000.  
Millage reduction computed as described in the text. “Normalized” means divided by 1989 tract average house value. 
Ordinary Least Squares. Conventional standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors robust to arbitrary within-district correlation in brackets. Data: 1990 Long 
Form in 2000 Boundaries and 2000 Long Form   36
TABLE 4 

















































































number of observations  1122  1115 1122 1115
R
2  0.329 0.374 0.350 0.402
s.e. of regression 23.289  20.903 22.924 20.439
mean of dependent variable (in percentage points) 47.69 47.27 47.69 47.27
include tracts with percent change in tract average house value > 200 percent? Yes no Yes No
Unit of observation: Census tract with at least 50 specified owner-occupied housing units in 1990 and 2000.  
Millage reduction computed as described in the text. “Normalized” means divided by 1989 tract average house value  
Weighted Least Squares. Conventional standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors robust to arbitrary within-district correlation in brackets. Data: 1990 Long 
Form in 2000 Boundaries and 2000 Long Form    37
 
TABLE 5 
Change in Fourth Grade Math Passing Rate Between 1991 and 1999 








change in average revenue between 1989 and 1999 













number of observations  83  83 
R
2  0.118 0.197 
s.e. of regression  9.890  9.492 
mean of dependent variable  39.028  39.028 
 
Unit of observation: school district. Ordinary Least Squares. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Data: Michigan Bulletin 1014 and Michigan Department of Education.   38
FIGURE 1 
Detroit Metropolitan Area in 1990 
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Source: SDDB, MI Bulletin 1014, and MI Dept. of Education. Property tax rates expressed in mills.    39
FIGURE 2  
1999 Real Foundation Allowance and 1993 Base Revenue 
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FA: Foundation Allowance. Revenue and foundation allowance expressed in thousands of 2000 
dollars. Source: Michigan Bulletin 1014. 
 
FIGURE 3 
Proportional Change in Real Household Income by Income Percentile 
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Solid line represents proportional change in real household income by income percentile between 1990 and 
2000. Dashed line represents proportional change in real average household income between 1990 and 
2000. Source:  Authors’ calculations using data from US Census for the Detroit metropolitan area.   40
 
FIGURE 4 
Cumulative Income Distributions in 1990 and 2000 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from US Census. Solid line represents the 1990 CDF; dashed line 
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FIGURE 5 
1990 District Average Household Income, Rental Value and Passing Rate 


































































































































Income and rental value are expressed in thousands of dollars; 4
th grade math passing rate is in percent. 
“District rank” refers to rank by district average housing quality. Data source: 1990 Long Form in 2000 
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 Districts weighted by number students taking math test in 1991. 




Proposition A-1: There exists a fixed point R* such that R*=φ(R*) 
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where ( ) R φ
′  and  () j vR
′  denote the derivatives of φ  and  j v  with respect to R . To 
calculate the derivative in the summation in (A-2), we use the boundary-indifference 
conditions:  
A-3.  11 (( 1 ) ) ( ( 1 ) )
ee
jj RR
je j j e j yy Uw y v Uw y v ττ ++ ,++ − = ,++ −     1 1 j J = ,..., −   
where  e y  is mean endowed income in the metropolitan area.
41 Differentiating (A-3) with 
respect to R  we obtain:  
A-4. 
1
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Here, ()
j U ⋅  denotes the derivative of  () U ⋅  with respect to its second argument. Solving 
(A-4) we obtain:  
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A price normalization is required. We fix  1 v ,such that  1 0 m vy < < . Hence  1 0 v
′ = .  







+ <  for all  21 jJ = ,..., − . Evaluating (A-5) for 
1 j = , we obtain  
A-6. 
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The inequality follows from  0
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and demonstrate that the result then holds for  1 j + . Equations (A-5) and (A-7) imply the 
first inequality below. The second inequality follows from income stratification: 
1 jj
ee y y
− > .  
A-8. 
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41  The metropolitan population is normalized to one, hence aggregate endowed income equals mean 
endowed income: Ye= e y .   44
Now (A-9) and (A-2) imply the first inequality below. The second inequality follows 
from observing that the  j n  sum to one, and the lowest endowed income in each 
community  j , 
1 j
e y
− , is less than the average endowed income in each community: 
1 jj
ee y y
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Define  () R Δ  as follows: 
 A-11.  () () R RR φ Δ= −   
Single-crossing in  y  implies that the  j v  ascend in order  j . This and  1 0 v >  imply that  
() 0 R φ >  when R=0, implying: 
A-12. (0) (0) 0 φ Δ= − <   
Differentiating (A-11) with respect to R  and using (A-10), we have:  
A-13. ( ) 1 ( ) 0 RR φ
′′ Δ= − >   
Moreover, ( ) R φ












= ∑ , that is less than one. This and 
(A-12)  imply that there is an R
∗ such that  ( ) 0 R
∗ Δ = .  
 